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Constitutional Law-THE FINE LINE BETWEEN PROTECTED AND NON-
PROTECTED SPEECH-McCall v. State, 354 So. 2d 869 (Fla. 1978).
In any situation involving the first amendment guarantee of free
speech, there exists an uneasy balance between the absolute right
of individual expression and the need for qualified restraint on that
expression. Although freedom should be the rule and restraint the
exception, restraint is both necessary and desirable.' With all due
deference to its constitutional primacy, free speech will ultimately
survive only to the extent that it exists in harmony with the broad
spectrum of basic human and societal freedoms. The nature of this
tension will be examined as it arose in McCall v. State, involving a
school setting.2 The overbreadth doctrine will then be analyzed es-
pecially as used by the United States Supreme Court in two differ-
ent antidisturbance statutes concerned with the school environ-
ment. Additionally, several factors will be enumerated which the
Florida Legislature should consider when drafting an antidisturb-
ance statute to replace the one struck by the McCall court.
McCall presented a classic instance of the confrontation between
individual and societal freedoms in an unlikely setting. In light of
the important issues eventually decided by the court, it is ironic
that this case arose out of a seemingly innocuous schoolyard dispute
between two children over the ownership of a good luck charm.
Noise from the dispute attracted a nearby teacher, who separated
the children and tried to resolve the conflict. Although the record
is not clear whether the teacher struck either child,3 one of the
youngsters ran home and told her mother, Mrs. McCall, that the
teacher had hit her.4
Mrs. McCall returned to the school with her daughter and con-
fronted the teacher. While more than fifty students watched and
listened, Mrs. McCall engaged in a "profane verbal attack" against
the teacher, demanding to know why her daughter had been struck.5
The tirade continued for roughly fifteen minutes until the assistant
school principal arrived and quieted Mrs. McCall.
The teacher later filed a complaint with the state attorney's office
charging Mrs. McCall with violation of section 231.07, Florida Stat-
utes,' the first portion of which makes it a second degree misde-
1. See D. FELLMAN, THE LIMrTS OF FREEDOM (1959).
2. 354 So. 2d 869 (Fla. 1978).
3. Transcript of trial at 17, 35-36, State v. McCall, No. 76-220053 (Dade County Ct. Jan.
6, 1977).
4. 354 So. 2d at 870.
5. Id.
6. (1977).
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meanor to upbraid, abuse, or insult a member of the instructional
staff on school property or in the presence of students at a school
activity.
Both prior to trial and at the conclusion of the state's case against
her, Mrs. McCall moved to dismiss the charges against her on the
ground that the statute was overbroad, vague, and standardless, in
that it restricted constitutionally protected speech. The motion was
denied each time, and Mrs. McCall was subsequently convicted and
fined $100.1
An appeal was brought directly to the Florida Supreme Court
based on the ruling of the lower court which passed initially and
directly on the validity of a state statute. 8 Justice Hatchett, writing
for a unanimous court, reversed the trial court and held the statute
unconstitutional as reaching speech protected by the first and four-
teenth amendments to the United States Constitution.9
The competing values in McCall bear witness to the inherent
difficulties in devising a workable standard of review for first
amendment controversies. On the one hand, a school cannot possi-
bly function if expression is not limited to some degree because
classroom order would dissolve into a contest to see who could talk
the loudest. On the other hand, a strictly regimented school could
forbid any and all "nonsanctioned expression," based entirely on
the administration's discretion.10 Between these two extremes an
acceptable standard must be formulated.
The overbreadth doctrine arises from the constitutional principle
that "a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities consti-
tutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means
which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of
protected freedoms."" In first amendment cases involving over-
breadth, a common distinction is made between a statute that is
overbroad on its face, and one that is overbroad as applied to a
particular factual situation. 2 This distinction is important because
a court reviews a statute challenged on facial overbreadth differ-
ently than a statute challenged for overbreadth as applied.
In a facial overbreadth challenge to a statute, a court is not gener-
7. Transcript of trial, supra note 3, at 8, 30, 39.
8. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(1).
9. 354 So. 2d at 870.
10. Olson, Tinker and the Administrator, 100 SCH. AND Soc'y 86, 86-87 (1972).
11. NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964) (Supreme Court reversed an Alabama
state court contempt order against the NAACP for refusing to disclose its membership lists
to the Alabama Secretary of State, a prerequisite for qualifying to do business in Alabama).
12. See Note, Grayned v. City of Rockford-A Limitation on the Application of the
Overbreadth Doctrine to Antidisturbance Regulations in the Schools, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 1263
(1973).
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ally concerned with the factual situation giving rise to the case, but
is concerned with whether it is possible for the statute to reach
protected activity. Under some circumstances, if it is possible for
the statute to prohibit protected activity, the entire statute is un-
constitutional regardless of whether the activity giving rise to the
case was protected or nonprotected activity." If it is not possible for
the statute to reach protected activity, the statute is facially consti-
tutional. However, in an overbreadth challenge to a statute as it has
been applied, the facts in the record are crucial.'" The defendant
must demonstrate that regardless of the statute's terms, it was ap-
plied to protected activity. If the court finds that the statute is thus
overbroad as applied, that portion of the statute prohibiting the
protected activity will be struck while any portions prohibiting non-
protected activity will remain in force."
The primary justification for striking in toto those statutes which
are facially overbroad is grounded in the similarity of the over-
breadth doctrine to the void for vagueness doctrine." Despite dis-
tinctions between the two doctrines, 7 the area in which they are
parallel facilitates an understanding of the underlying rationale for
declaring a statute entirely invalid. Both vague and overbroad stat-
utes fail to give fair warning as to what constitutes a breach of law;
consequently, individuals may forgo constitutionally protected ac-
tivities for fear of violating an unclear law. 8 In this way overbroad
13. In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612-13 (1973), the Court characterized facial
overbreadth review as a narrow exception to traditional rules of standing, to be employed only
in certain situations. Thus, facial review is limited to statutes which regulate speech alone,
statutes which burden rights of association, statutes purporting to regulate the time, place
and manner of expressive conduct, and statutes that provide no standards to guide the
discretion of the official charged with their enforcement.
14. Courts reviewing the constitutionality of statutes as applied will focus on the specific
facts in a given case, rather than on any hypothetical constitutional infirmities. See Herndon
v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937).
15. Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARv. L. REv. 844, 844-45
(1970). The court may achieve this either through restrictive construction or by separating
the offensive portion of the statute and leaving the remainder intact. Id. at 862.
16. Id. at 871-75. "Where statutes have an overbroad sweep, just as where they are vague,
'the hazard of loss or substantial impairment of those precious rights may be critical.'"
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 609 (1967) (quoting Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380
U.S. 479, 486 (1965)).
17. A statute is vague when "men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application." Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391
(1926). Overbreadth focuses, not upon any uncertainty of the statutory language, but upon
whether a statute has actually reached protected activity or, in some instances, whether a
statute has the potential for reaching protected activity. See generally Broadrick v. Okla-
homa, 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
18. See generally Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939). In Lanzetta, a New Jersey
statute, which essentially made it a crime to be a member of a gang, was held unconstitu-
tionally vague because of the ambiguity surrounding the meaning of the word "gang." The
Court demonstrated that a reasonable interpretation of the statutory language might include
some "groups of workers engaged under leadership in [a] lawful undertaking." Id. at 457.
19791
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statutes are invidious, not only because they may actually clash
with preferred freedoms, but also because of the substantial
"chilling effect" they may exert on the exercise of fundamental
liberties."1
The rationale for only partially striking statutes that are over-
broad as applied is two-fold. First, it exonerates the defendant
whose activity is protected and prevents further application of the
statute to that activity. Second, it permits the statute to function
in those areas where it prohibits nonprotected activity. The court
reviewing a statute so challenged examines the results generated by
the statute's application to the facts before the court. The technique
utilized in evaluating these results is a balancing of the interests
promoted by the statute against the personal and societal interests
advanced by the protected expression, and ultimately a determina-
tion as to which is weightier.2
The as applied review is more restrained and traditional than
facial review .2 Facial review, by invalidating statutes in toto, is
thought to generate tension between the judiciary and the legisla-
ture. Moreover, facial review seemingly violates the premise that
the court will not decide constitutional issues unless they are raised
specifically by the facts in issue.22
Two important United States Supreme Court decisions involving
first amendment freedom in the academic environment were cited
in McCall: Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District2l and Grayned v. City of Rockford.24 Tinker involved con-
duct that was "closely akin to 'pure speech.' "25 The Tinker Court
held that the wearing of black armbands by students at their public
school during school hours in protest of the Vietnam War was consti-
tutionally protected expression. Observing that other political sym-
bols were not banned from the school, the Court noted that "vigilant
protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in
the community of American schools." 2 However, the court hastened
to add that any conduct materially disrupting or substantially inter-
19. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 487 (1965) (potential members and contribu-
tors of appellant's organization were frightened off by accusations by state officials that the
organization was a Communist-front organization, whose members had to register with appel-
lee's Committee on Unamerican Activities or they would be prosecuted).
20. See Mendelson, On the Meaning of the First Amendment: Absolutes in the Balance,
50 CAL. L. REv. 821 (1962).
21. The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, supra note 15, at 845.
22. See generally Ashwander v. T.V.A., 297 U.S. 288, 345-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concur-
ring) (noting seven Court-developed rules used to avoid deciding many constitutional issues).
23. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
24. 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
25. 393 U.S. at 505.
26. Id. at 512 (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960)).
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fering with the rights of others is not immunized by the first amend-
ment.Y
In Grayned, the Court reaffirmed the material and substantial
interference test developed in Tinker.2 1 The ordinance in Grayned
prohibited "mak[ing] or assist[ing] in the making of any noise or
diversion which disturbs or tends to disturb the peace or good order
of [a] school session or class." 21 Despite contentions that the regu-
lation was overbroad, the Court held that this ordinance was consti-
tutional because it was "narrowly tailored" to furthering the city's
legitimate interest in having an uninterrupted school session.3
In both Tinker and Grayned the Court recognized that the state
has an important interest in education. Because the state has a
responsibility to maintain an academic atmosphere which is condu-
cive to learning, 3' a statute limiting first amendment freedoms may
be permitted even though it infringes upon a constitutional right as
basic as freedom of speech. This governmental interest was suffi-
cient to overcome a challenge of overbreadth in Grayned, but not
in Tinker.
Since the first amendment gives more freedom to people commu-
nicating ideas by pure speech than to those communicating ideas
by conduct, 32 statutes regulating primarily the former are far more
likely to be held unconstitutional by the Court than are statutes
regulating primarily the latter. In Tinker, the symbolic action of
wearing black armbands "was entirely divorced from actually or
potentially disruptive conduct by those participating in it." 33 In
other words, the student's expressive behavior more closely approxi-
mated pure speech than conduct. Grayned, on the other hand, in-
volved an ordinance aimed at regulating disruptive conduct.3 4
The United States Supreme Court will permit a first amendment
27. 393 U.S. at 513.
28. 408 U.S. at 118.
29. Id. at 108.
30. Id. at 119.
31. Id.
32. See generally Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 563-64 (1965) (narrowly drawn statute
prohibiting picketing near a courthouse upheld as a valid regulation of conduct as distin-
guished from pure speech).
33. 393 U.S. at 505.
34. Tinker and Grayned may be distinguished not only by virtue of the type of activity
regulated but also according to identity of the persons causing the disturbances. In Tinker,
only students were involved in the symbolic protest of the Vietnam War by wearing black
armbands to classes. 393 U.S. at 504. The Grayned case, on the other hand, involved a public
demonstration right outside the school by roughly 200 people, including students and nonstu-
dents. 408 U.S. at 105. In McCall, the defendant was a nonstudent, and furthermore, the
challenged statute expressly exempts students from its coverage. FLA. STAT. § 231.07 (1977).
However, the constitutionality of these statutes did not turn on who was causing the disturb-
ance.
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challenge by an individual whose conduct could be proscribed by
the state only if the overbreadth of the statute is "real" and
"substantial." The city ordinance in Grayned was narrowly tai-
lored to the school context, where "prohibited disturbances are eas-
ily measured by their impact on the normal activities of the
school."3 Reasoning that language can never achieve mathematical
certainty, the Court added that the ordinance was not overbroad
merely because it was marked by "flexibility and reasonable
breadth, rather than meticulous specificity."37
The following bifurcated approach provides a useful tool for ana-
lyzing the breadth of statutory language. The first step to ascertain
whether a time, place and manner regulation is constitutional con-
sists of examining the regulation on its face to determine if it is
narrowly tied to precluding the use of certain public facilities for
certain purposes at certain inconvenient hours. In the school context
this means the regulation must be aimed at prohibiting the disturb-
ance of normal classroom activities. The second step, to be taken
only if the first test is satisfied, is to determine if the regulation is
reasonable as applied to the conduct of the person before the court.3 1
This two-pronged test can be applied to the statute challenged in
McCall. The first clause of section 231.07, Florida Statutes, states
that anyone who "upbraids, abuses, or insults" a teacher "on school
property or in the presence of pupils at a school activity" is guilty
of a second degree misdemeanor. 9 Justice Hatchett, speaking for
the court, held that as a matter of statutory construction, the first
clause must be treated separately from the remainder of the stat-
ute.'" Cursory examination of the clause reveals that the proscribed
conduct, unlike that in Grayned, is not tied to disruption of normal
classroom activities at fixed times.
The McCall court demonstrated the ambiguity of this portion of
the statute by setting up two examples of patently protected expres-
sion which fall within the scope of its regulation.4 The court stated
that the first clause of section 231.07 would permit the conviction
of an old lady present on school property at midnight, with no
students around, who criticizes the quality of a teacher's work. Sim-
35. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973).
36. 408 U.S. at 112.
37. Id. at 110 (quoting Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 415 F.2d 1077, 1088 (8th
Cir. 1969)).
38. See generally Grayned, 408 U.S. at 119-20.
39. (1977).
40. 354 So. 2d at 872 n.3.
41. Using hypothetical examples to illustrate the ambiguity of a statute is a classic tech-
nique for reviewing facial overbreadth. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589
(1967); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Baggett v. Bullit, 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
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ilarly, a conviction could issue from an individual telling a band
instructor after a parade, while not on school property but in the
presence of other students, that the band played poorly because of
the band instructor's inability to teach music.2
That section 231.07 could reach these and other constitutionally
protected activities contributed heavily to the court's determination
that the statute was overbroad on its face. Therefore the acts of the
appellant were given no weight in the court's determination. Even
though McCall's actions were deemed reprehensible, deserving of
punishment, and may have been prohibited under a more carefully
drawn statute,43 she was permitted to escape the consequences of her
misconduct because the statute as drafted was overinclusive.
Chapter 231, Florida Statutes," which contains the section held
unconstitutional in McCall, deals with government regulation of
school personnel. The entire chapter is scheduled to be repealed in
1982.1 Pursuant to the Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, one year
prior to the repeal of that chapter, the legislature must begin review-
ing the state's role in regulating the school with an eye toward
restoring, replacing, or doing away with its various sections. 4
The fundamental change the legislature must make in section
231.07 is obvious. The prohibited expression contained in that sec-
tion must be tied to a material disturbance of the school classroom
at specific times in order to survive facial overbreadth review. Two
problems exist with the statutory language as it now reads. First,
by attempting to proscribe upbraiding, insulting, and abusive lan-
guage, the statute comes close to regulating speech based on its
content. Second, by including within its prohibitions insulting at-
tacks that occur in the presence of students at a school activity, the
statute proscribes conduct which is not directly tied to disruption
of normal classroom activities. Courts may determine that the state
interest in promoting school order is so attenuated at nonscholastic
activities that the statute would be punishing protected expression.
Thus, the best procedure for rewriting section 231.07 so that it would
pass facial overbreadth review would be to model the new statute
after the ordinance upheld in Grayned.
The state has an interest in the proper functioning of its schools
and parents have an interest in promoting stability in their homes.47
Both of these concerns suggest that the state and parents have a
42. 354 So. 2d at 872.
43. Id. at 872 & n.5.
44. (1977).
45. Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, ch. 76-168, § 3(3)(b), 1976 Fla. Laws 299 (omitted).
46. Id.
47. See generally Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968).
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significant interest in promoting respect for authority. Mrs. McCall
abused her parental privilege of questioning a teacher's handling of
her child when she chose to use a face-to-face billingsgate, rather
than a calm inquiry into her daughter's charges. Outbursts such as
hers tend to hold school personnel in a light which provokes con-
tempt and disrespect among students, and undermine the discipline
of a school. Arguably, personal attacks of this nature have no legiti-
mate place in the classroom, or at any school function where there
are students present.
On the other hand, reasoned criticism by parents of school poli-
cies and personnel should be constitutionally safeguarded. It is
questionable, however, whether the same protection should be af-
forded to the sort of attack made on the teacher in McCall. If paren-
tal abuse of a teacher or school official could be shown to contribute
to physical disruption in the classroom, it could clearly be prohib-
ited under the Grayned standard. But, even if the parental abuse
of a teacher or school official could not be shown to contribute to
classroom disruption, such conduct may produce other damaging
effects which may also deserve to be proscribed (i.e., the disrespect
for authority already mentioned)."
Whether this type of damage to the student-teacher relationship
may be prohibited under the Grayned disturbance standard is prob-
lematic. Nevertheless, neither Grayned nor Tinker suggests that
only that conduct which completely disrupts the classroom can be
prohibited. Depending on the situation, the nature of the disturb-
ance necessary to disrupt a classroom will vary. A properly drafted
statute which carefully ties abusing and insulting a teacher to those
situations where listening students would be adversely affected may
satisfy the Grayned standard.
Therefore, assuming that the legislature still wishes to do so, it
may be possible to rewrite section 231.07 narrowly enough to meet
the Grayned test, while retaining the notion of prohibiting abusive
and insulting language toward teachers in the presence of students.
But the statute must be worded so that private criticism of a
teacher, no matter how ascerbic, is not proscribed. Also, criticism
of a teacher in front of students should be carefully proscribed so
that it includes only abuse that undeniably promotes disrespect for
the teacher and school authority. And the statute should be worded
so that it could not be used by school administrators to suppress the
expression of ideas.
48. Concern that traditional notions regarding the teacher-student relationship, espe-
cially with respect to authority of the teacher, were being rejected without justification
prompted the vigorous dissent of Justice Black in Tinker. 393 U.S. at 515-26.
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All statutes, no matter how carefully drafted, are susceptible to
invalid application. The inherent limitations of language, coupled
with the need for statutory flexibility, make it difficult to write a
law not subject to some infirmity. These drafting difficulties are
multiplied in statutes involving speech and cummunicative con-
duct. At times, a court faced with a first amendment case will use
facial overbreadth review sweepingly to overrule challenged statutes
without regard to the offending conduct at issue. At other times, the
same court will evaluate a challenged statute as applied to the
conduct by balancing the interests promoted by the statute against
the interest in allowing such expression to continue. This divergence
is but a reflection of the delicate function of choosing between two
long-recognized and accepted constitutional rights: the cherished
right of free speech and the extraordinary power of the state in
promoting education of its citizenry.4
ARTHUR C. BEAL, JR.
49. Effective June 6, 1979, the Florida Legislature enacted Chapter 79-163, Laws of Flor-
ida, conforming § 231.07, Florida Statutes, to the decision in McCall. This was achieved by
deleting all reference to the first portion of the statute which was the subject of this comment.
The remaining portion of the statute was left intact and now reads:
Any person not subject to the rules and regulations of a school who creates a
disturbance on the property or grounds of any school, who commits any act that
interrupts the orderly conduct of a school or any activity thereof shall be guilty of
a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided by law. This section
shall not apply to any pupil in or subject to the discipline of a school.
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